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People v. Taylor: Collateral Estoppel in
Criminal Cases-Key Principles and
Policies
By WILLIAM C. OWENS, JR.*
Introduction
In People v. Taylor,' an unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice
Donald R. Wright, the California Supreme Court applied the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to a previously unexplored area of criminal law. The
decision extended the well-known holding of a civil case, Bernhard v. Bank
of America,2 to actions involving the vicarious liability of a defendant for
his accomplice's acts during the commission of a crime. In Bernhard, the
California Supreme Court had held that a person who was not a party to the
original litigation could, nonetheless, invoke the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel to bar the relitigation of an issue decided adversely to his opponent at the
prior trial, provided that such opponent was a party to the original litiga-
tion. 3 This principle was applied in Taylor to reverse a defendant's murder
conviction for aiding and abetting a confederate in the commission of a
crime for which the confederate had previously been acquitted.
The Taylor decision illustrates the careful and thorough analysis that
was the hallmark of Chief Justice Wright's work. Confronted with a case of
first impression, the Chief Justice looked to prior application of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel in related areas of the law and examined the policy
considerations underlying the use of the doctrine in the circumstances before
him. His opinion was skillfully drawn to meet all reasonable objections to
the extension of the doctrine to this new area of the law.
© William C. Owens, Jr., 1977.
* B.S., 1968, Yale University; M.B.A., 1969, University of Michigan; M.A. (Econom-
ics), 1970, University of Michigan; J.D., 1973, Harvard University; member, California, New
York and Texas bars. Law Clerk to Chief Justice Donald R. Wright, 1973-1974.
1. 12 Cal. 3d 686, 527 P.2d 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1974).
2. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
3. Id. at 811-13, 122 P.2d at 894-95.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
I. The Taylor Case
A. Lower Court Proceedings
People v. Taylor4 came to the California Supreme Court on appeal
from defendant Taylor's conviction for the death of one of his accomplices
during the holdup of a liquor store. 5 Taylor's role in the robbery was limited
to waiting in the getaway car while his confederates, Smith and Daniels,
entered the store. Once inside, they threatened the life of the couple who
owned and operated the store. Fearful of the threat to her husband's life, the
wife initiated a gunfight that resulted in Smith's death. Daniels was charged
with the murder of Smith on the theory that the threats to the robbery victims
were sufficiently provocative to support a finding that Daniels had acted
with malice aforethought, i.e., with "conscious disregard of human life," 6
and that, as a principal, 7 he was vicariously liable 8 for the death of his
accomplice. As an aider and abettor to the commission of a crime,9 Taylor
4. 12 Cal. 3d 686, 527 P.2d 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1974).
5. Taylor was also convicted of robbery as a result of this incident. That conviction was
affirmed on appeal. Id. at 698, 527 P.2d at 631, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
6. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1977). "[Aln essential element of
murder is an intent to kill or an intent with conscious disregard for life to commit acts likely to
kill." People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445
(1965).
7. "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, %hether it be felony or
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and
abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and
all persons counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of fourteen years,
lunatics or idiots, to commit any crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the
drunkeness of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats,
menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are principals in any
crime so committed." CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1970).
8. "Under the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies, the defendant may be
guilty of murder for a killing attributable to the act of his accomplice. To be so guilty, however,
the accomplice must cause the death of another human being by an act committed in further-
ance of the common design." People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 705, 408 P.2d 365, 374, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 909, 918 (1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
As the court in Gilbert explained: "When the defendant or his accomplice, with a con-
scious disregard for life, intentionally commits an act that is likely to cause death, and his victim
or a police officer kills in reasonable response to such act, the defendant is guilty of murder. In
such a case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a felony, but to the
intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice committed with conscious disregard for life.
"Thus, the victim's self-defensive killing or the police officer's killing in the performance
of his duty cannot be considered an independent intervening cause for which the defendant is
not liable, for it is a reasonable response to the dilemma thrust upon the victim or the policeman
by the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice." Id. at 704-05, 408 P.2d at 373-74,47
Cal. Rptr. at 917-18. See also People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781-82, 402 P.2d 130, 133-
34, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445-46 (1965).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1970).
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was similarly charged with Smith's murder. 10
At Daniels' trial, however, the state failed to establish that either
Daniels or Smith harbored the malice requisite to a murder conviction.
1'
Notwithstanding Daniels' acquittal of this charge, Taylor was convicted of
Smith's murder at a separate trial. Taylor appealed from the conviction on
several grounds,' 2 the most important of which was that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel barred his conviction. In this regard, Taylor argued that
the prior acquittal of Daniels for the same charge should have prevented the
state from relitigating this issue in Taylor's subsequent trial.
B. The Issue on Appeal
In a manner typical of his systematic analysis, Chief Justice Wright
began the Taylor opinion by discussing the basic principles underlying the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, which prevents a party from relitigating an
issue decided against him in a prior trial. He noted that collateral estoppel
bars relitigation of an issue if (1) it is identical to an issue decided in a prior
trial, in which (2) there was a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the
person against whom collateral estoppel is now asserted was a party or in
privity with a party in the prior litigation. 13 In Taylor, the first two require-
ments were satisfied. The issue of whether Daniels' and Smith's conduct
was sufficiently provocative to support a finding of malice was common
both to Taylor's prosecution and to Daniels' prior trial. Daniels' acquittal on
10. In appealing the denial of his earlier motion to set aside the information for the murder
count, Taylor had argued that the court should ignore evidence of Smith's conduct because
Smith could not be held responsible for his own death. The court rejected this argument on the
basis of People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777,780,402 P.2d 130, 132-33,44 Cal. Rptr. 442,444-
45 (1965), in which it was established that a defendant's criminal liability could not depend on
the fortuitous circumstance of which person was killed. "Therefore, the trier of fact may find
that Smith set into motion, through the intentional commission of acts constituting implied
malice and in furtherance of the robbery, a gun battle resulting in his own death. Since
petitioner may be held vicariously liable for any killing legally attributable to his accomplices,
he may be charged with Smith's death." Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 584 n.3, 497
P.2d 131, 135 n.3, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 n.3 (1970). Subsequent to the reversal of Taylor's
conviction on the ground of collateral estoppel, the California Supreme Court overruled the
holding in Taylor regarding a felon's liability for his own death. People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79,
92 n.12, 539 P.2d 43, 51 n.12, 112 Cal. Rptr. 475, 483 n.12 (1975).
11. 12 Cal. 3d at 691, 527 P.2d at 625, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
12. Taylor also contended that (1) there was insufficent evidence to support the verdict;
(2) he was improperly limited in the cross-examination of an important witness; and (3)
improper instructions were given on the issue of malice. Reversal on the basis of collateral
estoppel made it unnecessary for the court to consider these other grounds. Id. at 689, 527 P.2d
at 624, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
13. See Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942). See
also Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601,604, 375 P.2d 439, 440, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 559, 560 (1962), cert. denied sub nom. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. American Home Ins. Co.,
372 U.S. 966 (1963).
Fall 1977]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the murder charge was also a final judgment on the merits as to that issue.
The third requirement, identity of parties, presented some difficulty,
however. The holding in Bernhard v. Bank of America 14 which established
that the party seeking to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel need not
have been a party at the prior trial, had been applied to civil cases only. In
addition, several criminal cases contained dicta indicating that collateral
estoppel could not be invoked by a defendant who was not a party at the
prior trial. 15 But, as Chief Justice Wright's incisive analysis demonstrated,
these cases were readily distinguishable from Taylor for several reasons:
they failed to satisfy certain basic prerequisites of collateral estoppel, such
as identity of issue 16 and final judgment on the merits; 7 they concerned joint
trials that did not involve the question of collateral estoppel; 18 or they did
not involve the question of a defendant's vicarious liability for the alleged
crimes of a previously acquitted accomplice. 19 Courts in other jurisdictions
had, in addition, divided on the issue.20 It was thus apparent that no
controlling precedent was available to justify the application of the Bern-
14. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
15. See, e.g., Woodford v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 874, 112 Cal. Rptr. 773
(1970).
16. The issues were dissimilar either because the defendant had actively participated in
the crime and his conviction was therefore not based solely upon vicarious liability, People v.
Scoglio, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1, 3-5, 82 Cal. Rptr. 869, 870 (1969); see People v. Stone, 213 Cal. App.
2d 260, 262-65, 28 Cal. Rptr. 522, 523-25 (1963); People v. Gutierrez, 207 Cal. App. 2d 529, 530-
31, 24 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443 (1962), or because the perpetrator was acquitted as the result of an
affirmative defense not determinative of the criminality of his actions, such as intoxication,
People v. Massie, 122 Cal. App. 2d 235, 236, 264 P.2d 671, 672 (1953); deception, People v.
Collins, 242 Cal. App. 2d 626, 635-36, 51 Cal. Rptr. 604, 609-10 (1966); or duress, People v.
Hernandez, 18 Cal. App. 3d 651, 657, 96 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (1971).
17. Various proceedings against one of the perpetrators were terminated by a conviction,
People v. Newberry, 20 Cal. 439, 440-41 (1862); People v. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68, 69-70 (1858), or by
a plea bargain, People v. Griffith, 181 Cal. App. 2d 715, 719, 5 Cal. Rptr. 620, 622-23 (1960);
People v. Simpson, 66 Cal. App. 2d 319, 321-22, 329, 152 P.2d 339, 340, 344 (1944).
18. See, e.g., People v. Braun, 29 Cal. App. 3d 949, 973-74, 106 Cal. Rptr. 56,70-71(1973);
People v. AlIsip, 268 Cal. App. 2d 830,831-32,74 Cal. Rptr. 550,550-51 (1969); People v. Finch,
213 Cal. App. 2d 752, 777, 29 Cal. Rptr. 420, 434-35 (1963); People v. Blackwood, 35 Cal. App.
-2d 728, 732-33, 96 P.2d 982, 984-85 (1939).
19. Several cases involved questions of obscenity that affected the criminal liability of
several defendants, none of whom was held vicariously liable for the acts of the others,
Woodford v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 874, 877-78, 112 Cal. Rptr. 773, 775-76 (1974);
People v. Seltzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 52, 54-57, 101 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261-63 (1972). Another
case involved the question of the legality of a ban on demonstrations in a university recently
struck by violence, and again, none of the defandants was held vicariously liable, People v.
Uptgraft, 8 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 9-10, 87 Cal. Rptr. 459, 464 (1970).
20. Compare United States v. Prince, 430 F.2d 1324, 1325 (4th Cir. 1970); People v.
Walker, 361 Il. 482, 487-88, 198 N.E. 353, 356 (1935); Schmidt v. State, 300 N.E.2d 86, 87-88
(Ind. 1973); State v. St. Philip, 169 La. 468, 472-74, 125 So. 451, 452-53 (1929) with United
States v. Musgrave, 483 F.2d 331-33 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Rush v.
State, 239 Ark. 878, 879-81, 395 S.W.2d 3, 4-5 (1965); Roberts v. People, 103 Colo. 250,256-61,
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hard doctrine, and therefore the solution to Taylor would have to be
worked out through the application of basic legal principles.
C. Precedential and Policy Concerns
In laying the foundation for application of the Bernhard doctrine in this
area of criminal law, Chief Justice Wright first examined analogous Califor-
nia precedents in both civil and criminal cases. It was well established that
collateral estoppel would bar imposition of vicarious tort liability on an
employer for the actions of his employee when the latter had been ex-
onerated in a prior suit based on the same acts.21 Similarly, collateral
estoppel precluded a defendant from being convicted for criminal conspir-
acy when all alleged co-conspirators had been exonerated of this charge.
22
These precedents supported extension of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
to the Taylor case.
The Chief Justice then identified three policy considerations that also
favored the application of collateral estoppel to the situation at hand: (1) the
need to promote judicial economy by avoiding repetitive litigation; 23 (2) the
need to avoid inconsistent decisions that would in turn undermine public
confidence in the judicial system; and (3) the need to avoid harrassment of
the individual by repeated litigation of the same issue.24 Of these factors, the
need to prevent loss of confidence in and compromise of judicial integrity
appeared to be of paramount importance with respect to the issue of vicari-
ous liability. This factor is the key to the Taylor decision.
Public confidence in the orderly processes of the legal system is not
enhanced by two diametrically opposed verdicts on an identical issue in two
separate trials. This consideration is most important in criminal cases, which
87 P.2d 251, 254-57 (1938); State v. Cunha, 193 N.W. 2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1971); Christie v.
Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 799, 801,237 S.W. 660, 661 (1922); State v. Hess, 233 Wis. 4,7-9,288
N.W. 275, 277-78 (1939).
21. Barrabee v. Crescenta Mut. Water Co., 88 Cal. App. 2d 192, 195-97, 198 P.2d 558,559-
60 (1948). See Bird v. McGuire, 216 Cal. App. 2d 702, 718-19, 31 Cal. Rptr. 386, 397-98 (1963).
See also Adams Mfg. & Eng'r Co. v. Coast Centerless Grinding Co., 184 Cal. App. 2d 649,655-
57, 7 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765-66 (1960).
22. See People v. Reeves, 250 Cal. App. 2d 490, 493-94, 58 Cal. Rptr. 517, 519-20 (1967);
People v. James, 189 Cal. App. 2d 14, 16-17, 10 Cal. Rptr. 809, 810 (1961). See also United
States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
23. 12 Cal. 3d at 695, 527 P.2d at 628, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 76. As aptly noted by Chief Justice
Wright, the need to promote judicial economy by avoiding repetitive litigation was even more
important in criminal than in civil cases because court congestion and crowded dockets often
worked a hardship on defendants who were incarcerated prior to trial. Id. In addition, relieving
court congestion through the liberal use of collateral estoppel furthered social welfare by
reducing the pressure for plea bargains that were primarily motivated by a desire to reduce-case
backlog rather than to further the interests of the defendant.
24. Id. It should be noted that the need to avoid harassment through repeated litigation
may be irrelevant where the defendant, like Taylor, was not a party to the prior litigation. Id.
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generally receive more publicity. 25 In Taylor, a holding against the applica-
tion of collateral esoppel would have resulted in the defendant's conviction
for the alleged crime of his accomplice, even though the accomplice had
previously been acquitted of that same crime. As Chief Justice Wright aptly
stated:
Few things undermine the layman's faith in the integrity of our
legal institutions more than the specter of a system which results in
a person being punished for the acts of another, when the actor
himself under identical charges had been previously exonerated
from responsibility for those very acts. This is particularly so under
the facts of the instant case when the People seek to punish defend-
ant, who was not even present on the immediate scene, for the
death of an accomplice caused by the acts of another confederate
who himself has been exonerated.
26
II. Limitations on the Taylor Rule
Having found support in related precedent and cogent policy considera-
tions for extending collateral estoppel to the Taylor ase, Chief Justice
Wright then examined the state's policy arguments against application of the
doctrine. The state maintained that ignoring the requirement of party
identity would (1) cause difficulty in the identification of issues resolved
against the prosecution in the prior trial; (2) result in unfairness to the
prosecution in that the state would be bound by the result of the first trial
whereas the defendant would not be similarly bound; and (3) multiply the
effects of a potentially erroneous acquittal from the first trial. 27 In meeting
these objections, the Chief Justice displayed the careful craftsmanship that
was the hallmark of his work by limiting the court's holding to accommo-
date most of the policy arguments raised by the prosecution.
In response to the first argument, that it would be difficult to determine
which issues had been resolved after a verdict of acquittal were there no
requirement of party identity, Chief Justice Wright countered that the issues
would in fact be identical if the state prosecuted'a defendant under the theory
of vicarious liability for the criminal acts of the previously acquitted accom-
plice.2 8 In Taylor, the issue resolved adversely to the state in the prior trial
was whether the perpetrator of the crime had in fact committed the criminal
act for which Taylor was charged as an aider and abettor. To insure that the
identity of issue requirement would itself be satisfied in future cases,
however, Chief Justice Wright wisely limited the court's holding to situa-
tions in which the perpetrator's prior acquittal was based on a defense
25. Id. at 695-96, 527 P.2d at 628-29, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
26. Id. at 696, 527 P.2d at 628-29, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
27. Id. at 696, 527 P.2d at 629, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
28. Id.
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determinative of the criminality of his actions, i.e., not a defense of duress
or intoxication.
29
The prosecution's second argument against the application of collateral
estoppel was in fact two-pronged. The argument that the state would be
unfairly bound by the results of a prior trial if the defendant were not
similarly bound was based first, on an assumption that the prosecution was
not motivated to litigate the contested issue fully in the prior trial and
second, on the possibility that the defendant would then have two chances
for exoneration, either through prior acquittal of the accused perpetrator or
through acquittal of the defendant himself if the perpetrator were con-
victed.30
In disposing of the first part of this argument, Chief Justice Wright
observed that the prosecution was apparently more highly motivated to
litigate the issue of guilt in Daniels' trial than in Taylor's. The evidence
indicated that Daniels was the ringleader for the liquor store robbery, while
Taylor appeared to have played only a minor role.31 To reduce the possibili-
ty that collateral estoppel might be applied in situations where the prosecu-
tion in the prior trial had not been motivated to litigate the contested issue
vigorously, however, the Chief Justice narrowed the court's holding to
situations in which the defendant had not instigated or directly participated
in the crime for which the state sought to hold him vicariously liable. 32
In disposing of the second half of the argument regarding the defend-
ant's chances for exoneration, Chief Justice Wright observed that the same
contention had been rejected in civil cases establishing that parties to a
pending suit were entitled to invoke for purposes of collateral estoppel a
prior judgment by which they were not bound. 33 He limited the application
of this rule in criminal cases, however, to situations involving only one
defendant, 31 which was the case in Taylor. Whether collateral estoppel
would apply in a case with many potential defendants who might benefit
from the results of a previous trial and whose criminal liability was not
based solely upon vicarious responsibility was explicitly left unresolved. 35
29. Id. at 697 n.13, 527 P.2d at 629 n.13, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 77 n.13.
30. Id. at 697, 527 P.2d at 629, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 697 n.14, 527 P.2d at 630 n.14, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78 n.14.
33. Id. at 697, 527 P.2d at 630, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78. This principle had been established in
the Bernhard case and reaffirmed in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d
601, 606-07, 375 P.2d 439, 441-42, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561-62 (1962), cert. denied sub nom.
Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. American Home Ins. Co., 372 U.S. 966 (1963).
34. 12 Cal. 3d at 697, 527 P.2d at 630, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
35. Id. at 697 n.15, 527 P.2d at 630 n.15, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78 n.15. If many potential
defendants could benefit from the plea of collateral estoppel, the state would be foreclosed
from prosecuting all other defendants if it lost its case against any one of them. At the same
time, the prosecution would gain little by conviction of any one defendant because the remain-
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The prosecution's third argument against the extension of collateral
estoppel was the perceived need to avoid multiplying the effects of a
potentially erroneous verdict of acquittal in the first trial. This argument was
based on an apprehension that the prior verdict of acquittal might have been
the result of defects in the evidence submitted to the trier of fact or of
erroneous rulings of law by the trial judge. In any case, according to the
prosecution, the prior verdict of acquittal meant only that the perpetrator's
guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, not that the perpetrator had
not in fact committed the crime. In disposing of these concerns, Chief
Justice Wright initally reviewed the evidence presented in Daniels' trial,
compared it with the evidence adduced in Taylor's trial, and concluded that
the different results in the two trials could not be explained by differences in
the evidence.3 6 The Chief Justice again narrowed the court's holding,
however, by limiting it to situations in which no claim was made that the
prosecution had obtained new evidence after acquittal in the prior trial.
37
The effect of newly discovered evidence on a plea of collateral estoppel was
thus left for resolution in a subsequent case.
38
Chief Justice Wright then dismissed the claim that Daniels' acquittal in
the prior trial was the result of an erroneous jury instruction concerning
malice as an element of murder. He noted that the jury instructions on the
subject were substantially the same in both trials and that both instructions
correctly stated that malice could be inferred from conduct that involved a
high risk of death, in conscious disregard of human life. 39 Realizing that the
prosecution might be hampered by an uncorrectable and unreviewable 4°
error of law committed by a trial judge, Chief Justice Wright again prudent-
ly tailored the court's holding to situations in which the prosecution did not
allege that the prior verdict of acquittal was based on errors of law.
Finally, with respect to the state's contention that a judgment of
acquittal meant only that guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
not that the crime itself was not committed, Chief Justice Wright aptly noted
ing defendants would urge that they were not bound by collateral estoppel in that they were not
parties to the prior prosecution. This consideration seems to be implicit in the decisions of a
number of courts of appeal that had rejected the plea of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Woodford
v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 874, 877-78, 112 Cal. Rptr. 773, 775-76 (1974); People v.
Seltzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 52, 55, 101 Cal. Rptr. 260, 260-63 (1972); People v. Uptgraft, 8
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 9-10, 87 Cal. Rptr. 459, 464 (1970).
36. 12 Cal. 3d at 698, 527 P.2d at 630, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
37. Id. at 698 n.16, 527 P.2d at 630 n.16, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78 n.16.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 698, 527 P.2d at 630, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
40. Id. at 698 n.17, 527 P.2d at 630 n.17, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 78 n.17. If a defendant is
acquitted, the prosecution is limited in the issues it may present for appellate review. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1238 (West Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 4
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
that the burden of proof in the original trial upon which the plea of collateral
estoppel was based is the same as the burden of proof in the subsequent
criminal trial.4 More significantly, the prior acquittal of an alleged perpe-
trator raises a reasonable doubt about his guilt, which, in turn, should raise
reasonable doubt about the guilt of his alleged aider and abettor, particularly
when the guilt of the latter party is based solely on his vicarious liability for
the crimes of the perpetrator.
42
Conclusion
People v. Taylor43 represents a necessary extension of the doctrine of
Bernhard v. Bank of America4 to cases involving vicarious criminal
liability. The decision reflects Chief Justice Wright's extensive judicial
skills in dealing with a case of first impression. On the basis of a careful
analysis of precedent and a weighing of policy arguments, the Chief Justice
carefully tailored his opinion to accommodate key objections. An important
addition to the law of collateral estoppel, People v. Taylor45 has enhanced
the California Supreme Court's preeminent reputation as a national leader
in the development of the law.
41. 12 Cal. 3d at 686 n.12, 527 P.2d at 629 n.12, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 77 n.12.
42. Id.
43. 12 Cal. 3d 686, 527 P.2d 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1974).
44. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811-13, 122 P.2d 892, 894-95 (1942).
45. 12 Cal. 3d 686, 527 P.2d 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1974).
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